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Abstract 
When making decisions about action to improve animal lives, it is important that we have 
accurate estimates of how much animals are suffering under different conditions. The current 
frameworks for making comparative estimates of suffering all fall along the lines of 
multiplying numbers of animals used by length of life and amount of suffering experienced. 
However, the numbers used to quantify suffering are usually generated through unreliable and 
subjective processes which make them unlikely to be correct. In this paper, I look at how we 
might apply principled methods from animal welfare science to arrive at more accurate scores, 
which will then help us in making the best decisions for animals. I argue that a combined use 
of both a whole-animal measure and a combination measurement framework for assessing 
welfare will give us the most accurate answers to guide our action. 
 
1. Introduction 
Around the world, over 50 billion land animals and up to 100 billion fish are raised in 
intensive (‘factory’) farms every year, often in very poor conditions. Broiler chickens are kept 
packed into barns with less than a square foot each, and often suffer deformities and lameness 
due to breeding for unnaturally fast growth. Salmon - wide-ranging carnivores with complex 
social lives – are kept within crowded pens on salmon farms, where disease and parasites 
quickly spread. Female breeding pigs are kept in tiny stalls, without room to turn around, or a 
soft place to sleep. 
With this level of animal suffering in the world, when thinking about how to do the most 
good, animal welfare is one of the things we should consider. Most people agree that animal 
welfare is morally important. It is bad for animals to suffer and good for them to have happy 
lives, and where possible we should act to prevent the former and enable the latter. All else 
being equal, people would prefer farm animals receive better, rather than worse treatment. But 
we have limited resources available to us, and so are required to make decisions about where 
to prioritise our actions or interventions. All our actions come with an opportunity cost, that of 
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some other action we could otherwise have taken that may have provided other benefits. 
Typically, we want to choose actions in such a way so as we will have the greatest possible 
impact. If our goal is to reduce suffering, then we want to reduce suffering as much as we can. 
When considering animal welfare, making decisions like these then requires us to have an 
accurate understanding of the quality of life of animals living under different conditions. We 
need to accurately measure animal welfare in order to take relevant and effective action. 
Animal welfare can be taken to mean different things – as with human wellbeing, there are 
theories of animal welfare that take welfare to consist in different subjective or objective goods. 
Here, I take a hedonic view of animal welfare, in which welfare consists in the subjective 
mental states experienced by an animal - “the quality of its emotional states, including their 
sign (positive or negative), intensity and duration” (Bracke, 2001, p. 45)1. This is a common 
view within animal welfare science, as well as in writing on animal ethics and welfare within 
the effective altruism community. Even where one rejects this as a complete view of welfare, 
it is still true that the positive and negative experiences of animals – their pleasure and suffering 
– comprise at least part of animal welfare, and thus are important to measure. Where our goal 
is not to improve welfare, whatever that may be, but instead simply to decrease suffering and/or 
increase pleasure for animals, then this work will be relevant. 
One obvious implication of taking a subjective view of welfare is that we need to believe 
that animals possess the relevant subjective mental states – i.e. that they are sentient. It is now 
commonly accepted that at least some animals are sentient, as embodied by the Cambridge 
Declaration on Consciousness in 2012 – “the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not 
unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human 
animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also 
possess these neurological substrates” (Low et al., 2012, p. 2). A large part of the work in 
animal sentience is in attempting to identify which animals are sentient and researchers use a 
range of physiological and behavioural evidence, such as neuroanatomy and response to 
analgesics (painkillers), to look for signs of sentience. Current research suggests that all 
vertebrates, cephalopods (octopuses and squid) and arthropods (crustaceans, insects and 
spiders) are sentient (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019). As currently only a small fraction of extant 
species and even taxonomic groups have been studied to determine sentience, the boundaries 
 
1 There are a number of important issues in measurement of hedonic welfare that I will not be considering here, 
such as considerations of the shape of life and integration of positive and negative experiences; these are the 
subjects of other work. 
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are still unclear. Whichever animals we find to be sentient will be the targets of our moral 
concern for their welfare. 
Working to identify and implement our best interventions for improving animal lives 
requires accurate measures of animal welfare. We want to assess the current animal housing 
systems, in order to identify the best and worst conditions. We also want to compare different 
possible interventions we might take, to assess their potential effectiveness. A number of 
writers have been working to this end, to try to produce comparative measures of animal 
welfare, or – more commonly – animal suffering, with which to compare systems. In animal 
welfare science, this often takes the form of comparing different farming systems for a 
particular species, to make recommendations as to the best systems of housing and husbandry 
(e.g. Botreau, Veissier, & Perny, 2009; Bracke, Spruijt, Metz, & Schouten, 2002). In global 
priorities and effective altruism research, there has been a growing amount of work - largely 
unpublished – in creating ‘suffering calculators’. These aim to compare the total suffering 
produced by different types of production systems (e.g. Norwood & Lusk, 2011; Savoie, 2018; 
Tomasik, 2018; Warren, 2018). As most of the animals in human care are livestock animals 
used for food production, this has usually been the area of focus for research of this type, though 
there is some work on wild animals (e.g. Ng, 2016; Tomasik, 2015). In this paper, I am 
interested in these suffering calculators, and how we can ensure we are inputting the right 
information to get accurate outputs of comparative suffering with which to guide our decisions. 
Suffering calculators have been created to compare the total suffering produced by different 
sets of conditions – most often different agricultural systems. These calculators take a variety 
of different types of information on the numbers of animals used, the length of life of these 
animals and the quality of their life (or amount of suffering experienced) on an average day. 
An example of this type of calculator is shown at Table 1 (taken from Tomasik (2018)). 
Norwood & Lusk (2011) use an ‘Ethical Eating Assessment Tool’ which calculates the welfare 
consequences of a particular action (such as changes in consumption of different animal 
products) relative to another, through multiplying the number of animals affected by the change 
by the welfare score of those animals. Scherer et al. (2018) produced a welfare index of 
‘Animal Life Years Suffered’ (ALYS), which is equal to the number of animals used multiplied 
by measures representing suffering and length of life. A number of other websites and charity 
evaluators use similar calculators to measure the number of equivalent years of suffering that 
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can be saved per dollar donated, often for specific species only (e.g. Open Philanthropy 
Project2, Animal Charity Evaluators3). 
 
TABLE 1: Suffering calculator (from Tomasik, 2018) 
Animal Product Average 
lifespan 
(days) 
Production 
per lifetime 
(kg) 
Suffering 
per day 
of life 
Sentience 
multiplier  
(0-1) 
Number of days of 
life equivalent to 
pain of death 
Weighted days of 
suffering (per kg) 
Milk 1825 30000 2 0.95 15 0.12 
Beef 395 212 1 0.95 30 1.9 
Pork 183 65 2.5 1 12 7.5 
Turkey 133 9.6 3 0.8 10 36 
Chicken 42 1.9 3 0.8 10 66 
Cage eggs 501 16 4 0.9 7.5 110 
Farmed salmon 639 2.0 1.5 0.5 15 250 
Farmed catfish 820 0.39 1.5 0.5 15 1600 
 
The information in these tables is then used to create estimates of the total suffering 
produced by different systems. For example, we can see in Table 1 that this calculator tells us 
that catfish farms produce over 10,000x more suffering than dairy farms. This would then give 
us impetus to act to reduce the suffering of farmed catfish, either by reducing their numbers, 
or improving their lives (see further discussion in Section 5). These calculators can also factor 
in effects such as elasticity in purchasing to allow for more fine-grained comparisons between 
the effects of decisions to switch between different animal products.   
These suffering calculators have several components in common. The first is number of 
animals used. This measure can be taken as a whole measure of simply the total number of 
animals present within each type of system. Alternatively, and more commonly, it is taken as 
a production measure; that is, a measure of the production output of each animal used. This is 
often done in terms of just kg of meat/eggs/milk produced, but also sometimes in slightly more 
sophisticated ways, such as comparing per gram of protein, or kilojoule count, to allow for 
nutritional differences between product types. This type of measure helps to ensure equivalence 
if considering dietary shifts. That is, if a person is planning to reduce pork consumption in 
favour of chicken, this will result in a different number of animals being used to produce the 
same volume of food and so we cannot simply compare a single chicken to a single pig in terms 
 
2 https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/initial-grants-support-corporate-cage-free-reforms 
3 https://animalcharityevaluators.org/research/methodology/our-use-of-cost-effectiveness-estimates/  
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of quality of life. Actions which reduce consumption of particular products will save a different 
number of animals, depending on the product. This would be a difficult measure to compare in 
non-agricultural systems of animal use, such as horse-racing or zoos. In these cases, the simpler 
‘number of animals used/affected’ may be more appropriate. 
The second component is lifespan. Length of life is important as it affects the duration of 
suffering experienced. It seems intuitively compelling that more days of suffering are worse 
than fewer days of suffering, and more days of pleasure better than fewer. However, this may 
sometimes produce counterintuitive results, as it will often come out that many animals with 
low quality of life are better off the shorter their lives are and so this will favour production 
systems with a high kill rate (though these typically contain a higher number of animals and so 
will still lose out all things considered due to the high total amount of suffering). 
The primary measure of interest for this paper is welfare, or quality of life measure, often 
recorded as average suffering. It is a measure of the welfare level of the animal; the amount of 
pleasure or suffering it experiences. This is typically taken as a measure of the quality of the 
average day experienced by the animal, but can also be modified to take into account the impact 
of rare or unusual experiences, such as veterinary procedures, handling and slaughter. This can 
be applied as a relative score, as in the Tomasik (2018) calculator, where beef cattle are 
assigned a ‘1’ as the lowest level of suffering and others are multiplied from there (so for 
example, a cage-housed egg-producing chicken is scored as having a life four times as bad as 
a beef cow). It can also be an absolute score measured on a scale relative to the maximum and 
minimum possible welfare levels an animal could experience. This is most commonly done on 
a positive-negative scale such as -10 to 10, where -10 represents the worst possible welfare 
experience, 0 a neutral experience with a predominance of neither positive nor negative states, 
and 10 the best possible experience of a happy animal. 
Two further components contained in many suffering calculators are sentience multipliers 
and badness of death measures. Sentience multipliers refer to the relative sentience or capacity 
for suffering that different species may possess. Badness of death measures try to quantify how 
bad the loss of life itself is for animals killed prematurely. Both of these are important for 
comparative total measures of lifetime animal welfare, but too complex to be discussed in detail 
here, forming the basis for future investigation. 
In this paper I will only be concerned with how we fill in the quality of life, or welfare 
component. The problem with the welfare score as it has been used so far, is that this measure 
is computed in a number of vastly different ways, which can then lead to vastly different results. 
Table 2 (adapted from Warren, 2018) shows the estimates given by a few of the more 
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commonly used models, and shows how much they differ. In some cases, the sign of the score 
is different, indicating that under some measures it comes out as positive (a life of mainly 
positive experiences; a life worth living) and others it comes out negative (a life of mainly 
negative experiences; not worth living). This is clearly a problem if these scores are a critical 
part of the calculations that are supposed to guide our decision-making. We would end up 
endorsing what could be quite different courses of action, depending on which estimate we 
chose to use. 
We want to ensure we have accurate inputs so that we can find those actions which will 
actually do the most good. In particular, this means we need a good measure of animal 
suffering, or animal welfare more generally, to enter into these calculators. In this paper, I will 
begin in Section 2 by looking at the desiderata for a good measure of animal welfare, grouped 
into the categories of correctness, usefulness and feasibility. I will then go on in Sections 3 and 
4 to assess a range of possible methods of measurement according to these desiderata, with 
recommendations as to which are likely to give us the best results4. I will finish in Section 5 
by looking at the upshots of these considerations and identifying some useful areas for future 
work. 
 
TABLE 2: Suffering estimates (adapted from Warren, 2018) 
Farmed Animals Warren Norwood Shields Norowitz Tomasik Scherer et al. Savoie et al. 
Beef  +6  +6  +2  +6  1 (reference)  0.66 -20 
Dairy  0  +4  0  -4  x2  0.76 -34 
Fish  -5  
 
-7  -7  x 1.5  1.0 -44 
Pork  -5  -2  -5  -10  x 2.5  0.80  
Turkeys  -6  +3 -8  -11  x3  0.39 -57 
Broilers  -6  +3  -8  -13  x3  0.39 -56 
Cage-Free Hens  -7  +2  
 
-7  
 
  
Veal  -7  -8  
   
  
Caged-Hens  -8  -8  -7  -25  x4  0.60 -57 
 
 
 
 
4 A similar project has been started in unpublished work by Savoie (2018). This is a promising start in recognising 
the need for improved measurement and the value of critically assessing the current possibilities. However, their 
final framework seems limited, largely due to capturing more than was perhaps intended (i.e. moral value as 
opposed to welfare), and in the non-transparent weighting procedure of different components. 
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2. Desiderata for a welfare index 
When trying to decide which is the best measure to use in quantifying quality of life for 
ethical decision-making, we need to have in mind what features this measure must have. The 
potential criteria can be roughly grouped into three categories – correctness, usefulness and 
feasibility. Here I will go through a list of proposed desiderata for a welfare index and discuss 
why each is important for our purposes before moving on in the sections that follow to look at 
how well different methods of measuring welfare meet these criteria.  
 
2.1 Correctness criteria 
Correctness represents the degree to which the measure will give us the right results to use 
in our calculations, numbers that really do reflect the welfare as experienced by the animals. 
These are the more crucial criteria, as without the right inputs, our results will be meaningless. 
 
2.1.1 Validity 
A measure is valid if it is measuring the intended target, instead of some other state. This is 
probably the most important of the desiderata, as if a measure is not valid – if it is not actually 
measuring animal welfare - it does not much matter how well it meets the other criteria. It is 
thus important that we are very clear about what our target state is – the integrated set of mental 
states that constitute welfare – to ensure we are measuring this and only this. As mentioned 
previously, under different conceptions of welfare, there may be other things one thinks 
comprise welfare (such as some objective states of health or naturalness), but these are not the 
targets for this project. It is not sufficient to have a broad category of those things which matter 
to us ethically with regards to animals. There are a range of things that humans might think are 
important for or about animals that the metric would then need to capture, despite them not 
actually relating to welfare as experienced by the animal. This would then give us misleading 
results, and lead to recommendations of actions which may not actually benefit the animals at 
all. Taking a pre-defined notion of welfare and then assessing validity relative to this is a better 
way of ensuring we hit our intended target.  
Validity can be tested through the presence of reliable correlations between changes in the 
measure and changes in the target state, particularly under experimental manipulations. This 
requires that a causal relationship hold between the target and the measure – the measure must 
be either a cause of, or an effect of the target. Correlation alone is insufficient, as many 
unrelated factors may correlate under particular test conditions (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & 
van Heerden, 2004).  In some cases, correlation may arise from the target and the measure both 
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being a common cause of another state, but here the measure would be tracking the common 
cause, not the target and thus would not be a valid measure of the target. In these cases, there 
is a high possibility of additional effects ‘screening off’ changes in the target from changes in 
the measure and so we would not get a reliable correlation. 
One might be concerned that we cannot validate any measures of subjective welfare, as the 
intended target – mental states – is hidden from measurement. Instead, all we have are surrogate 
or proxy measures, that can only ever be validated against one another. There are two lines of 
reply to this. First, I think there are good reasons to be confident that with multiple lines of the 
right kind of evidence, tested against one another, we can infer that the best explanation for 
observed correlations is changes in welfare states. This is particularly true in cases where we 
can use manipulations in upstream variables (such as husbandry inputs) to create changes in 
downstream variables (such as animal-based measurement indicators) to establish causal 
connections. Second, even if we may not have complete confidence in the validity of any 
measures of subjective experience, we can still rank the proposed measures for validity, based 
on how well they have been tested and found to correlate with one another. The problem holds 
equally for all potential measures. Although we might still deny certainty that any of them are 
really mapping onto mental states, if any of them are then we can identify which are more 
likely to be doing so. 
 
2.1.2 Accuracy 
As well as being valid (measuring the intended target), the measure should be accurate. This 
means that the measured values are close to the actual values in the target system – that when 
welfare is high, the measured values are high, and the same for medium, low, neutral etc. This 
includes sensitivity in detecting relevant changes in welfare. That is, that when there are small 
changes, increases or decreases in an animal’s experience, the measured values will change 
accordingly. Particularly in cases where we are comparing quite similar systems or looking at 
the impact of different interventions on a system, the changes might be quite small though the 
total impact still large if affecting a large number of animals. Insensitive measures that fail to 
track such changes will not provide the right recommendations. 
It is possible for a measure to be valid, and measuring the correct target, but still inaccurate 
because it does so poorly. For example, think of making estimates of environmental 
temperature based on one’s subjective ‘feeling’ of how hot or cold it is. I might make a guess 
that the outdoor temperature is in the low 20s, based on how warm I feel. This is a valid 
measure, as I am responding to environmental temperature, and not some other state. However, 
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it is measure with low accuracy, as I am likely to have the value correct only within a range of 
around ±5°C. It would also be possible to have a measure which is accurate, but not valid, as 
it is not measuring the intended target, but some other target, perhaps a common cause which 
creates changes both in the target variable and the measure. 
 
2.1.3 Holism 
We want a measure to be holistic – to provide an account of the entire state of welfare of 
the animal. What we don’t want is a measure that represents only some part of the animal’s 
experience, such that some aspects are left out, or overlooked. For example, some measures 
may reflect only physical health, while not accounting for psychological aspects of welfare. 
Holism may refer to representing the entire set of mental states for an animal on a given day 
(as is the case for most of these calculators). It may also refer to its total welfare experience 
over a lifetime, requiring the combination of several different measures representing different 
life states/events and their duration. This could include the ‘average day’ measure, with 
additional ones for expected days of particularly high or low welfare (e.g. veterinary 
procedures, slaughter), weighted for their relative impact and duration.  
 
2.1.4 Reliability 
The measure should be reliable, meaning it should give consistent results when repeated. 
The variation between repeated measures should be low. Repetition in this sense can be of 
many kinds (Czycholl, Büttner, grosse Beilage, & Krieter, 2015), and ideally our measure 
should be reliable across all of them. Intra-observer reliability refers to the variability in results 
for multiple repeated measures taken by the same observer. Inter-observer reliability refers to 
agreement in measures taken by different observers, of the same target. Test-retest reliability 
refers to the ability of the test of produce consistent results at different times and under different 
conditions. High variability in results can be offset to some degree by repeated testing to find 
common patterns (where there is not bias in one direction) but this will make the measures less 
feasible due to higher investment of time and resources. Where reliability is low, we would 
have less confidence that our results in any particular test were accurate, or even that our test 
is valid. In particular, having observer-independence in our measures will increase our 
confidence in their reliability (as seen in the lack of reliability for the observer-dependent 
measures collected for Table 2). 
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2.2 Usefulness criteria 
The correctness criteria described above are the most significant for selecting the right 
measure, as they ensure we have the right results. However, we also want our measure to do 
well for the task required. Usefulness criteria describe how well the measures fill the role we 
require them for – how strong the outputs of these measures are in providing the best data for 
the job. 
 
2.2.1 Range of applicability 
Ideally, we want our measure to be useful across a range of different circumstances of 
interest. Probably most importantly, we would like to use the same measure for all the species 
we are investigating. Using different measures for different species risks weakening our 
comparisons. There is a large range of animal species we want to take into account - from large 
mammals through to the insects and shrimp now used in farming systems - and our measure 
should be applicable to all of them.  We also want a measure that can be used across a range 
of types of animal usage, from livestock to wild animals, to increase the scope of our decision-
making. A measure that is useful only in a small range of circumstances may still be the best 
one for those particular applications, but particularly for priority-based decisions, we want to 
have the ability to consider and compare a wider range. 
 
2.2.2 Cardinality 
When thinking about what sort of features the outputs of the model should have, we need to 
consider for what uses they are intended. Some models have produced numbers intended only 
for ordinal rankings. For example the Norwood & Lusk (2011) model produces numbers are 
completely comparative. They represent the relative importance of giving up the different food 
types, rather than an absolute measure estimating suffering; the value of choices rather than of 
states. The Tomasik (2018) model gives a similar relative ranking, aiming to show how much 
of any one product creates as much suffering as another. Where we have a need only for relative 
rankings, to tell us which are the best or worst states, such ordinal measures are fine so long as 
they correctly reflect the different levels of suffering.  
However, we will often want to make more fine-grained decisions than simply “should we 
care more about salmon farming than egg production?”. We may want answers to questions 
like, “how much worse off are farmed salmon than dairy cows?” or “are we better off 
supporting an intervention to improve the lives of laying chickens by 10% or the lives of 
intensively-produced pigs by 15%?”. Here the differences between the levels will also be 
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important. In these cases, the outputs of the welfare index must be cardinal, rather than ordinal, 
in order to allow us to do the calculations we need to assess different interventions. In practice, 
this means we are likely to want our measure to produce values according to a ratio scale, with 
consistent intervals between levels, and a meaningful zero point. Identifying the zero point, 
what it means and how to measure it, is crucial for measuring welfare and making assessments 
of experiences, or lives, as positive or negative. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore 
this issue, but it is an important area for future work. 
Our measure should also be bidirectional; capable of representing both welfare states in both 
directions (positive and negative). Some measures, particularly those only concerned with 
suffering, will not consider positive welfare experiences and this can skew results. For instance, 
Scherer et al. (2018) use a 0-1 scale, where 0 represents best possible welfare and 1 worst 
possible suffering. They then use this as a suffering multiplier, which means even the best 
possible state is represented as simply the absence of suffering, not the presence of positive 
experience. As animals can experience positive welfare, and this is also something we care 
about, we want our measure to have the capacity to capture it. This does not mean that the total 
possible intensity on either side of the zero point must be the same – it is possible, for instance, 
that the worst possible states of suffering are worse than the best possible states of pleasure are 
good and we might want to have something like the +10 to -25 scale used by Norowitz (in 
Warren, 2018) for this reason. All that is required is that our measure can capture experiences 
on both sides of the neutral line.  
 
2.3 Feasibility criteria 
We want our measures to be correct and useful, so that they give us accurate results that we 
can apply where we need them. Feasibility represents how easy the measure is to collect and 
apply across the range of circumstances we are interested in. These criteria are less important 
than either of preceding two sets; they would be good to have where possible, but not essential. 
They can still, however, give us reasons to prefer some measures over others, particularly in 
the real-world circumstances in which we will be using them, with their various limitations.  
 
2.3.1 Ease of use 
Ease of use refers to how easy our measure will be to collect and apply. All of our measures 
will need to be taken and applied in real-world situations, with limitations on time, money, 
access to animals etc. This means it is going to be better to have a measure which is easy to 
collect, preferably a simple procedure that does not require a large amount of time or money. 
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Particularly for large-scale applications requiring measurement of a large number of animals, 
or for a large range of institutions, time-consuming or complex measurements and calculations 
may prove intractable. 
 
2.3.2 Current data availability 
One restriction on measures we want to use now, or in the near future, is current availability 
of relevant data. Many of the measures I will discuss are quite new, and data is not yet available 
for many species. Where we want to quickly start making comparisons for immediate action, 
we might prefer a measure for which a lot of data has already been collected, rather than one 
for which we still need to go into the field and undertake the relevant measurements. 
 
2.4 Assessing measures of welfare 
I have listed the desiderata that we want our welfare measure to meet, taking into account 
considerations of correctness, usefulness and feasibility. There are a number of different types 
of measures of welfare that we then want to assess, to see how well they meet these criteria. 
What we don’t want to do is to run a quantitative assessment. It would be possible to score 
each measure according to how well they meet each of the desiderata and use the resulting tally 
to choose the ‘winner’. However, there is a concern that this sort of method could lead to 
misleading precision; an example of “excessive quantification and systematization (in light of 
the relatively low amount of explanation and checkability), in an area where evidence is 
uncertain and in-depth critical judgment is necessary to draw meaningful conclusions” (Cotra, 
2017). Scores would be assigned with a large degree of subjectivity, and the weightings 
between them would also be highly arbitrary. Here I have instead used a qualitative approach 
in considering whether measures meet the desiderata. There are no explicit scores given, and 
no specific weightings applied for the different criteria, though some are given higher priority 
than others. This means there is no definitive rating of the different measures. The approach 
instead allows for a discussion of each of their benefits and drawbacks, and of which features 
our ‘ideal’ measure should possess. In the following sections I will look at a range of different 
types of welfare measures, and discuss how they perform in relation to the desiderata. 
I have divided up the measures into two categories – whole animal measures and 
combination measures. Whole-animal measures are a single indicator which are taken to 
represent the entire quality of life as experienced by the animal, at least at the point in time the 
measure is taken. Combination measures are more complex, combining multiple lines of 
evidence, appropriately weighted to give a single quality of life score. A similar distinction 
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between types of measures is made by Beausoleil and Mellor (2011) who divide types of 
welfare assessment into whole animal profiling (WAP) and systematic analytical evaluation 
(SAE). They argue that WAP allows for better integration of evidence into a single welfare 
score but cannot provide information on specific conditions that might impact welfare. SAE is 
better in identifying areas of welfare compromise and assessing the potential welfare impacts 
of interventions to provide specific recommendations on welfare improvements. For this 
reason, they may be most useful when used in combination, as I will recommend here. 
 
3. Whole-Animal Measures 
The first set of measures I will assess are whole-animal measures. These measures consist 
of a single indicator, used to represent the total quality of life for the animal. Whole-animal 
measures are in general useful because they can give a single holistic score and are often quite 
quick and easy to apply. Their primary drawback is in failing to provide information on which 
conditions in animals’ lives are causing them suffering. Here I will discuss the most commonly 
used measures of this type – human intuitive estimates, qualitative behavioural assessment 
(QBA), cognitive bias, and neuroimaging – assessing their appropriateness, according to the 
desiderata. 
  
3.1 Human intuitive estimates 
Human intuitive estimates are the most commonly-used measure in providing indices of 
animal suffering, as currently used for global priorities and effective altruism research (e.g. 
Norwood & Lusk, 2011; Tomasik, 2018; Warren, 2018). This involves an observer (or, ideally, 
a set of observers, as used for Savoie (2018)) who observe the conditions of the animals, or 
read a detailed description of the life and conditions, and on this basis form a judgement as to 
the amount of suffering, or quality of life of the animal within this system. These deliberations 
often take the form of something like “how bad is it to be this animal?” or “how much would 
I like/dislike being this animal?”. These assessments are offered with varying degrees of 
transparency. For example, Warren (2018) provides a detailed reason for each of his scores, 
including all the factors likely to affect welfare and their duration/intensity. Norwood & Lusk 
(2011) also spend some time describing the relevant conditions and how these affected their 
score. By contrast, Tomasik (2018) simply applied a multiplier based on intuitions about 
animal lives without description. Though this was based on assessment of the descriptive 
evidence about the conditions, the process of arriving at a decision was not laid out. 
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The major drawback of this process is the subjectivity. The ratings are based on the intuitive 
judgements of the observers. Even where the reasons for the judgements are described, the 
overall decision procedure is entirely subjective; based on the priorities and weightings applied 
by the observer, which are generally opaque. This is particularly vulnerable to incomplete 
information, and anthropomorphic ranking of needs. This subjectivity undermines the 
correctness criteria for the measure. It is likely to be invalid as what is being measured here is 
not really animal quality of life, but instead something like observer preference for particular 
kinds of housing situations and types of animal lives. As people are not necessarily very good 
at seeing life from the point of view of another species (for example, imagining the impact of 
sensory environments we do not ourselves experience), then this will not often lead to correct 
results. It is also unreliable – as seen in Table 2, there is a large range of variation between 
different observers and their scores. This also means the measures are unlikely to be accurate, 
as the range of measures attributed for each system is so variable. The rough estimation of 
scores is also likely to give low precision, where small changes in conditions may not be 
reflected by changes in assigned scores. For example, the difference between a 7.0 and a 7.2 is 
unlikely to be obvious to most people making the estimates. This low degree of reliability and 
accuracy was also found by Otten et al. (2017) when comparing the estimates of different 
experts regarding welfare measures for swine and cattle, with professional affiliation playing 
a strong role. The measure may or may not be holistic, depending on how well the observer 
does at incorporating all the aspects of the animals’ lives which might impact on welfare, but 
in most cases, it seems likely that at least something will be missed. 
The benefits of this approach are primarily in operationalising – usefulness and feasibility. 
The measure is cardinal (though we might question just how strongly this is true – given the 
way numbers are estimated and applied, the differences and ratios between them may not be 
particularly meaningful). Although it has not always been applied as such, the measure can be 
bidirectional, allowing for measures of both happiness and suffering. It is applicable across a 
range of systems and species, providing sufficient information is available and observers feel 
themselves competent to judge the experiences of those species. It is a quick and easy measure 
to apply, in cases where sufficient information is available about the housing systems and 
species of interest. There is sufficient data available about the housing and husbandry 
conditions of most captive animals to apply this method immediately. 
 
Verdict: Perhaps useful as a (very) rough and ready approach for making quick assessments 
in the absence of any other data - particularly if only trying to rank different systems - but 
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results should be treated with extreme caution. Any detailed calculations regarding the 
comparative impact of different interventions is highly unlikely to be accurate. Further work 
to validate these measures against more objective indicators might give some strength to their 
use, but given the current variation in estimates, this is unlikely to be successful. 
 
3.2 Qualitative behavioural assessment (QBA) 
In Qualitative Behavioural Assessment (QBA) experienced observers make a judgement 
about the welfare of animals through direct observation. They do this by looking at animal 
behaviour and body language as an expression of the total welfare state of the animal 
(Wemelsfelder, Hunter, Mendl, & Lawrence, 2001). This differs from the human estimates 
described above, in which people make judgements based on observations of the living 
conditions of the animals alone. While human estimates work on the ‘inputs’ to welfare, QBA 
uses the ‘outputs’. QBA is carried out by having a set of observers assess the overall body 
language of an animal against either a set of fixed terms or through generating their own 
descriptive terms. They score the animal for each of these characteristics (e.g. nervous, alert, 
curious, excited) by marking a point on a line between the ‘minimum’ and ‘maximum’ for 
these traits. These scores are then converted to numerical scores (0-100, relative to a theoretical 
minimum and maximum) by the researchers and analysed for general patterns. Rather than 
looking at a single aspect of an animal, it is a whole-body approach that reflects how an animal 
is interacting with its environment. It is an “integrative welfare assessment tool” (Wemelsfelder 
et al., 2001, p. 209), in which the observer is unconsciously integrating many pieces of 
information from the behaviour and body language of the animal. The aim is to assess not so 
much the behaviours themselves, but the ‘style’ of the behaviour, as representative of the 
animal’s overall mood (Wemelsfelder, 1997). 
The primary benefits of this method are in feasibility. It allows for a simple and rapid 
assessment of the wellbeing of an animal, without the need to consider the many features of 
that animal’s housing and husbandry that may be relevant. It is a quick and versatile measure 
that can be used in situations where it might be difficult to collect more detailed data (Fleming 
et al., 2016). Current data availability is moderate, with the process having been applied to a 
range of farm animals (Gutmann, Schwed, Tremetsberger, & Winckler, 2015; Muri, Stubsjøen, 
Vasdal, Moe, & Granquist, 2019; Wemelsfelder, Hunter, Mendl, & Lawrence, 2000; Wickham 
et al., 2015), though so far often looking for the impacts of specific conditions, such as transport 
rather than quality of daily life. It gives cardinal outputs, though again we might have some 
concern as to the nature of these numbers and whether they are robust enough to perform the 
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calculations we require. Further analysis of this method would allow use to judge whether this 
really is the case. It allows for bidirectionality, to identify animals with both positive and 
negative overall welfare. 
QBA also scores well on correctness criteria. It has been validated against other scientific 
measures of animal welfare, correlating with other relevant physiological and behavioural 
indicators (Wemelsfelder, 2007), illustrating that it is not merely subjective judgement but 
observation of real features of the animal. Although it is not objective, this method has been 
shown to have high reliability, with similar scores produced by different observers and under 
different conditions, with minimal training required (Fleming et al., 2016). It appears to be 
sensitive to subtle differences between animals, or over time (Fleming et al., 2016). It gives a 
holistic assessment of the entire state of welfare of the animal.  
The primary drawbacks are that it is not applicable over very many species. So far it has 
primarily been used for large mammals (and recently, chickens (Muri et al., 2019)). Given its 
reliance on human estimates of behaviour and body language, it may not be of much use for 
species very unlike ourselves or those we are not so familiar with, such as fish and insects 
(though Wemelsfelder (2007) thinks this is possible, just a matter of acquiring familiarity with 
and skill in assessing these more phylogenetically distant species). 
 
Verdict: This method has most of the benefits of the ‘human intuitive estimates’ approach, 
without the drawbacks relating to lack of accuracy or validity. However, it will have a limited 
range of use, as it may not work for all species and if used alone can’t tell us anything about 
the impact of particular conditions on welfare. 
 
3.3 Cognitive bias 
Cognitive bias tests measure the overall ‘mood’ of an animal. The mood of an animal can 
be thought of as its cumulative welfare state, a sum or averaging of its positive and negative 
experiences up to that time (Mendl, Burman, & Paul, 2010). There is good evidence that mood 
state can affect different cognitive processes (Boissy & Lee, 2014), and these resulting 
cognitive biases can be used as a test of mood, or welfare. 
The primary test of cognitive bias is judgement bias5, which works by looking to see how 
‘optimistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ an animal is. In judgement bias tests, animals are trained to expect 
a reward under one stimulus and a punishment under another. For example, if a light activates 
 
5 Most papers referring to cognitive bias testing of animals use this to mean judgement bias 
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in the right-hand corner of the room, they will receive a positive stimulus (e.g. food), and if it 
activates in the left-hand corner of the room they will receive an aversive stimulus (e.g. a loud 
noise or strong puff of air to the face). They are then presented with an ambiguous signal, such 
as a light somewhere in the middle of the room, to see how they react – whether they behave 
as though they are about to receive the reward (optimistic), or the punishment (pessimistic). 
Individuals who have experienced primarily positive states - i.e. those who are likely to have 
lived in an environment providing fitness-enhancing rewards - will be likely to view ambiguous 
signals optimistically, as potential rewards. Conversely, individuals who have experienced 
primarily negative states (low reward opportunity environments) will be more likely to view 
ambiguous signals pessimistically, as potential threats (Mendl et al., 2010). “Mood state may 
thus act as a heuristic device influencing cognitive processes and facilitating appropriate 
decision-making behaviour” (Mendl et al., 2010, p. 2900). This leads to a cognitive judgement 
bias varying with background mood. This has been established in human subjects, and is now 
the subject of a lot of work on animals, including mammals (Mendl, Burman, Parker, & Paul, 
2009), birds (Deakin, Browne, Hodge, Paul, & Mendl, 2016), fish (Laubu, Louâpre, & 
Dechaume-Moncharmont, 2019) and even honeybees (Bateson, Desire, Gartside, & Wright, 
2011) across a range of situations. This work is relatively new, but results so far give positive 
indication that this is an effective measure of overall welfare state. 
From tests so far, cognitive bias measures appear to score highly on correctness criteria. 
They have been validated through analogous work on human cognitive bias, as well as 
producing the predicted results under experimental manipulation (Mendl et al., 2009). This also 
gives us reason to be confident in their accuracy. They are holistic measure, taking an ‘output’ 
score of the overall mood of the animal, integrating the full range of its welfare experience. 
Although they have not been specifically tested for reliability, the apparent success across a 
range of species and study conditions is promising.  
They also score well on usefulness criteria. They can give cardinal output scores, based on 
degree of judgement bias as relative to established maximums and minimums, and these scores 
are bidirectional, recognising both positive and negative welfare states. They should be 
applicable across many conditions and species – current work has ranged through mammals, 
birds and fish, and in principle the procedure seems like it could also work for invertebrates. 
The primary drawback in judgement bias testing is in feasibility, particularly the advance 
training required in order to assess an animal. Not only is this time-consuming, reducing the 
feasibility of the measure, but may also reduce accuracy. Training animals can be enriching, 
improving their welfare (Melfi, 2013), and so measures taken of animals undergoing this 
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training would not be accurate reflections of the welfare of typical animals under their other 
husbandry conditions. For this reason, further work into other types of cognitive bias could 
help develop more suitable tests, which do not require training. These are attention bias, in 
which animals experiencing negative affect will show increased attention to negative stimuli, 
and memory bias, in which animals experiencing negative affect will show greater recall of 
negative memories (Clegg, 2018). Measures of anticipatory behaviour, in which an animal will 
show higher anticipation for reward when in a positive emotional state (Spruijt, van den Bos, 
& Pijlman, 2001), could be another promising cognitive bias measure, and one that also does 
not require training. Current data availability is moderate, with some work on a range of farm 
animals (Deakin et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2018; Scollo, Gottardo, Contiero, & Edwards, 2014), 
but more work is required to produce results from the range of standard housing systems.   
 
Verdict: This method is probably the most promising of the whole-animal measures, due 
primarily to the accuracy and range of applicability. Further work is needed to ensure the 
measures really are valid, accurate and reliable, as well as to standardise against potential 
maximum, minimum and neutral-level scores. 
 
3.4 Neuroimaging 
Neuroimaging is a new procedure, and one that has so far not been well-studied in its 
application to welfare. This method takes scans of animal brains to look for activation in the 
regions representing positive or negative mental states. Work identifying the regions of the 
brain responsible for generating positive and negative experience (Berridge & Kringelbach, 
2013) could be used to identify the valence and intensity of emotional reactions to stimuli, and 
possibly in assessing overall levels of pleasure or displeasure at a specific time. This work is 
still in the very early stages, mostly in humans, however there have been some promising 
results where both subjective report of intensity of experience, and behavioural responses, 
correlate with intensity of brain activity (Coghill, McHaffie, & Yen, 2003). Recently, Poirier 
et al. (2019) have argued that measures of biomarkers for the hippocampus (a part of the brain 
responsible for learning, memory and emotional regulation) may give us information about the 
cumulative affective experience, or overall welfare status, of animals. Hippocampal volume, 
amount of local grey matter and neurogenesis (development of new neurons) have all found to 
positively correlate with other measures of welfare, such as subjective self-report in humans, 
and mood in animals (Poirier et al., 2019). 
 19 
Currently, work in neuroimaging is too new for us to know whether it may be successful as 
a welfare measure. The work mentioned above suggests it is likely to be valid, indicated 
through correlation with other measures. If this is true, it may be the strongest measure we can 
have, as it is accessing intensity of mental states more directly than any other measure. This 
would make the measures highly likely to be both accurate and reliable. For now, work has 
been done primarily on pain, and we would need to establish if results hold across a range of 
mental states, and if these integrate into overall welfare scores, to give us holism. 
Neuroimaging measures should score high on usefulness, as they can be applied across a large 
range of species (though further work would be required to validate the measures for animals 
with brains quite different than our own, such as fish or invertebrates), and can give cardinal 
outputs, from intensity of activation along a scale. 
The biggest problem in using neuroimaging would be feasibility, as it does require 
expensive equipment and the restraint of animals. As well as taking time and money, restraint 
could also reduce accuracy, as we may only be measuring neural response to the stress of the 
current condition (though the hippocampal biomarkers approach discussed above will not have 
this problem). Although recent work has used animals trained for voluntary entry into the 
machines (Berns, 2018), this is not likely to be feasible for a large range of species. There is 
also no real current data availability, so this method is not useful for current decision-making. 
 
Verdict: Currently too early for any real use, but probably a very promising area for future 
work. 
 
TABLE 3: Assessment of whole-animal measures 
 Correctness Usefulness Feasibility 
 Valid Accurate Holistic Reliable Range Cardinal Ease of use Data 
Human estimate O O O O P P P P 
QBA P P P P O P P - 
Cog bias P P P - P P O - 
Neuroimaging P - - - P P - O 
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The above table summarises the discussion of the different types of measures. A tick 
represents a measure strongly meeting the requirements of the desideratum, a cross represents 
failing to meet the requirements, while a dash represents either neither strong failure nor strong 
success in this regard, or lack of available data to decide. This is intended only as a visual 
representation of the qualitative assessment above; the measures are not specifically compared 
on the number of ticks and crosses but on how well they are considered to do across a range of 
categories, particularly the more important, such as validity. Of the whole-animal measures 
assessed here, the most promising seems to be cognitive bias, provided further testing confirms 
it to be a valid and reliable measure. QBA could also be very useful if it can be applied across 
a wider range of species. Future work on neuroimaging may make this a strong preferred 
measure. 
In general, whole-animal measures are a very useful way of making an accurate measure of 
the entire state of welfare for an animal. They will take into account all aspects of welfare and 
will in general be quicker and easier to apply than combination measures that require multiple 
lines of evidence. They are weakest in their inability to provide details about the reasons for 
the welfare score and thus will do well used in conjunction with combination measures.  
 
4. Combination measures 
The next set of measures I will assess are combination measures. In creating combination 
measures, we take multiple indicators, which each represent a component of quality of life, 
such as nutrition, health and behaviour. We would then take a score for each and weight them 
according to their relative contribution to overall experience, to attain an overall quality of life 
score. They can thus give us detailed information about the impact of different conditions on 
animal welfare. The major drawback to these models is that we may risk leaving out some 
aspect of welfare, so that our calculations are incomplete, or may not know enough to produce 
accurate weightings of the different components. Here I will assess the most commonly used 
combination measures - the Five Domains model, Welfare Quality® protocol and SOWEL-
type models. 
 
4.1 Five Domains 
The Five Domains model (Mellor, 2016) measures overall welfare through measurement of 
each of its components. In this model, the animal is scored for welfare impact over five 
different domains – four ‘physical’ domains which reflect the life conditions that affect welfare 
(nutrition, housing, health and behaviour), and the fifth ‘mental state’ domain which is what 
 21 
welfare consists in. The four physical domains affect welfare only through their effects on the 
mental states in the fifth domain. So, for example, the domain of Nutrition may include a 
component requiring sufficient food quantity, but the ultimate impact of this condition is on 
the subjective feelings of hunger or satiety, as represented in the fifth domain. The domain of 
Behaviour may include a component referencing natural foraging behaviour, but the ultimate 
impact is on subjective experiences of reducing frustration and fulfilling curiosity and 
satisfaction. This fifth domain counts both positive and negative mental states relating to 
provisions and lacks in the other four domains. All conditions are therefore represented with 
their relevant mental states in mind. 
For each of the first four domains, the relevant impacts are identified and the animal is 
assigned a (qualitative) grade A-E which represents the level of compromise in that particular 
domain (A being no compromise, E being severe compromise), as relating to the negative 
affects experienced, and their severity, intensity and duration. The fifth domain of mental state 
then makes some attempt to combine these different impacts in terms of their effects on overall 
mental state to give a score in this domain. It is in this step that something like an informal 
integration procedure is used, albeit one based primarily on the knowledge and intuition of the 
assessor/s. The scores for each domain are brought together and assessed contextually to give 
a single overall welfare score. 
This is a comprehensive welfare measure. It should be valid, as the framework is applied 
deliberately with animal mental states in mind as the target. There is a degree of subjectivity 
in the scoring mode, which could compromise reliability, though this has not been tested. This 
model does not attempt to compare the relative impact of the different domains (e.g. whether 
health status affects welfare more than nutrition), and so the ‘overall’ score is not supposed to 
be a strong representation of overall quality of life, meaning it may not be holistic. It also does 
not claim to necessarily include all factors that affect welfare, only those for which there are 
reliable indicators that can be used (Mellor, 2017). This means that we may not have accurate 
measures, or ones which are sensitive to all changes.  
The framework will be highly feasible. It can be applied quite easily as it does not require 
any specific measurements to be taken; instead observers rate the quality of different aspects 
of animal housing and care. The information required about the housing and husbandry 
conditions of the animals is currently available, and so the framework could be quickly applied 
where needed. It is useful in that it has a high range of applicability – the general domains and 
associated mental states will be relevant to most types of animals. 
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The major drawback of the Five Domains framework is that it is an ordinal system only 
(Beausoleil & Mellor, 2015), where each of the domains is scored qualitatively. The intervals 
between the grades are not standardised (i.e. the difference between A and B does not 
necessarily represent the same level of welfare change as between C and D). This was 
deliberately built into the model to prevent over-precisification where the data does not support 
it: “numerical grading was explicitly rejected to avoid facile, non-reflective averaging of 
‘scores’ as a substitute for considered judgment and to avoid implying, unrealistically, that 
much greater precision is achievable than is possible with such qualitative assessments” 
(Mellor, 2017, p. 10). This means however that there is no way to combine these scores as there 
are no weightings given to the different components. Scores can thus only be compared for 
rank, while not containing any information about the amount of difference between ranks. It is 
targeted primarily as a ‘focussing’ device, to gain a greater understanding of the welfare of an 
animal, and the conditions impacting it, rather than a measurement tool as such. It would not 
be simple to convert this to a cardinal measure, as the subjective qualitative assessments would 
not lend themselves to an accurate numerical representation, without giving rise to the 
problems of the ‘human intuitive estimates’ method discussed earlier. If it were possible to add 
quantitative information, this could be quite powerful for welfare assessments due to its 
comprehensive nature. 
 
Verdict: This is a comprehensive model, which maintains focus on the mental states that 
constitute welfare, but without a numerical scoring system would not be of real use in the 
context discussed in this paper, which requires quantitative comparisons. Adding a quantitative 
component to the framework could overcome this limitation but would require substantial 
reworking. 
 
4.2 Welfare Quality® 
The Welfare Quality® framework (Botreau et al., 2007) works on a similar principle as Five 
Domains, that of using a variety of measures of different aspects of housing and husbandry to 
create an overall welfare measure. It takes 12 welfare criteria, across four principles – feeding, 
housing, health and behaviour. Each of the criteria is then assigned several indicators and 
multiple measures are taken. These are aggregated into the criteria, followed by another 
aggregation into the welfare principles and finally bringing it all into an overall assessment of 
the quality of the facility, with regard to the welfare of its animals (Botreau et al., 2009). 
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This framework does poorly on correctness criteria. The measures are objective and chosen 
to be repeatable and reliable, so should do well on this front (though see Czycholl et al., 2016 
for concerns). Unlike the Five Domains, there is a reduced focus on the affective states of 
animals and so what we are measuring may not be representative of the subjective welfare 
states of the animals, meaning this is unlikely to be valid. This also means that some criteria 
might be missing, or unnecessary, and so also unlikely to be accurate. Missing or incorrect 
criteria will also mean the measure is not holistic, as there may be parts of welfare experience 
which are not accounted for. Additionally, the 12 criteria were taken from discussions with 
consumer-citizens as well as scientists and so do not necessarily represent welfare from the 
animal point of view. The aggregation weightings are also quite opaque, and seem to be based 
on expert opinion rather than measured effect on the animals (de Graaf et al., 2018).  This 
means that the model is much less likely to be valid or accurate. This could potentially be 
overcome through further work to validate the framework against whole-animal measures, but 
may require substantial changes to the current inputs and weightings.  
In terms of usefulness, the framework does well in creating cardinal outputs. However, as 
new indicators need to be developed for each species it also has limited range of applicability 
for now, though could be extended to a variety of species in future work. For feasibility, the 
measures have been selected specifically to be easy to use and apply. There is limited current 
data availability for many species, though the framework has been used for a range of 
agricultural animals, including pigs (Czycholl et al., 2016), cattle (de Graaf et al., 2018) and 
hens (Blatchford, Fulton, & Mench, 2016).   
 
Verdict: This model currently has too many subjective judgements built in to be confident 
about its validity or accuracy, though further work to validate it could help with this. 
 
4.3 SOWEL-type models 
The SOWEL model was developed by Bracke et al. (2002 a; 2002 b) for assessing the 
welfare of breeding sows. The same framework has been used to create similar models for 
assessing welfare of chickens (the FOWEL model - De Mol et al., 2006) and cows (the 
COWEL model - Ursinus & Schepers, 2009). Similarly to the other frameworks described, 
these models are built by selecting a number of needs (in these models, 12) and scoring various 
attributes for each need (25 attributes in total for these models). Each attribute is given a 
discrete score between 0-1 depending on the quality of the measure (e.g. for number of eating 
places, the categories might be: sufficient, limited, and restricted, receiving scores of 1, ½ and 
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0). The attributes are then given weightings, based on information available in the literature 
and a total score calculated as the weighted sum of the attribute scores. These weightings are 
not just assigned to the whole attribute, but different values within an attribute so that, for 
example, extreme pain may have a much larger ‘pull’ on total welfare score than mild pain. 
This allows for variation in the two types of weightings – weightings between conditions and 
weightings between different levels of a condition (Norwood & Lusk, 2011). This is a 
comprehensive procedure and allows for changes to be made as new information is attained 
(e.g. on range of needs, their link to attributes and the weightings of attributes): “the decision 
support system is designed to be adaptable, that is, new insights can be incorporated when these 
become available” (Bracke, Metz, et al., 2002, p. 1835). The data in the model is directly linked 
to a table of the referenced data (e.g. comments in scientific papers) to allow for transparency, 
as well as making it updatable. 
These models run into many of the same problems as the Welfare Quality® framework, but 
the transparency of the aggregation procedures and the capacity to update input data make it 
much more flexible in the face of new information. Again, the reduced emphasis on mental 
states may mean that the measures are not valid, tracking other aspects of the animal’s life than 
subjective welfare. Though only currently validated against expert opinion, which may be 
unreliable, the authors acknowledge that further validation is desirable: “We have only 
validated the model with expert opinion, which, though not a truly independent measure, is the 
best available standard at present. Empirical validation would be welcome, but it is presently 
not known how to measure the overall welfare status directly or indirectly” (Bracke, Metz, et 
al., 2002, p. 1844). For the same reasons, the framework may have low accuracy. In particular 
is a problem in the scoring of the attributes – ordinal scores are applied and treated cardinally, 
without any justification for a linear relationship between the different levels of score (e.g. that 
the difference between sufficient eating places and limited is the same as between limited and 
restricted). Given that the categories are arbitrarily chosen, this assumption of cardinality may 
not often hold. Another issue is in the assignment of weightings – these were not standardised 
and what counted as relevant data could vary from weighted preferences, to qualitative 
comments by scientists in their paper. The framework is intended to be holistic, but this will 
only be true if all relevant criteria have been covered. However, as mentioned, one of the 
benefits of these models is the transparency, and the ability to update and alter these scores and 
weightings as new data emerges to improve the framework on all these counts. Although the 
current inputs into the model are not ideal, the underlying framework of the model is such that 
this could be easily improved and strengthened.   
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This model can be highly useful. The data output is cardinal, though not bidirectional, as 
scores are taken from 0-1, which doesn’t allow for tracking of positive and negative welfare 
states. This would need to change in order for these models to be applied in the range of 
contexts we are interested in. We must also be careful with cardinal use of the data, as the 
transformation of ordinal inputs into cardinal outputs is not currently justified. The models can 
be applicable across a large range of species and situations, providing the relevant frameworks 
were constructed. It can also be feasible. With the right selection of attribute indicators, 
measurement could be quite simple, and objective. Although the current availability of data is 
low – as mentioned above, applied only to sows, cattle and chickens – there is the potential to 
apply this framework widely. 
 
Verdict: A very promising framework, and the one that seems most likely to work in this 
setting. Needs further work to strengthen the attribute measures and weightings, such as 
validating against whole-animal measures and taking relative preferences, but the flexibility of 
the framework to allow such changes is its greatest strength 
 
TABLE 4: Assessment of combination measures 
 Correctness Usefulness Feasibility 
 Valid Accurate Holistic Reliable Range Cardinal Ease of use Data 
Five Domains P O - - P O P P 
Welfare Quality O O - P - P - P 
SOWEL - - P P - - P O 
 
Table 4 summarises the discussion of the combination measures, and how well they meet 
the proposed desiderata. As with the whole-animal measures, this is meant simply as a visual 
representation of the assessments – the number of ticks and crosses is not a direct reflection of 
the relative quality of each of the measures. Combination measures are useful as they provide 
detailed information on the conditions of animal lives, and how they impact welfare, which can 
be used in providing recommendations for action. Their primary weakness is that they may not 
take into account all influences on welfare. This can be ameliorated to some degree by ensuring 
we have a full list of conditions in a well-validated model, but still cannot account for internal 
influences such as individual personality or history. The SOWEL-type models seem to be the 
best of the set, as they have the ability to provide a full set of conditions with weightings set 
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by data about impact on animals, as opposed to subjective opinion or guesses. Although they 
are currently not ideal with regard to the data inputs, their strength is in their transparency in 
terms of the data input and aggregation procedures, and the fact they can easily be modified as 
new data are discovered. 
 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper, I have proposed a range of desiderata for a measure of animal welfare, and 
then assessed a range of welfare measures against these criteria to find which will best meet 
our requirements. In the end, what we will want to use is a both a combination and a whole-
animal measure together, as they have complementary strengths and weaknesses. Doing so 
allows us to get a sense of the overall mood/welfare of an animal, while still having sufficient 
detail about living conditions to allow us to determine where change is required. It also allows 
us to validate the measures against one another to make sure we have not missed anything on 
either side.  
One of the biggest weaknesses of the combination measures is the current subjectivity 
involved in setting weightings for the different components within the model. Use of whole-
animal measures allows us an objective method for determining weightings, to figure out what 
impact different experiences have on welfare from the point of view of the animal. We would 
start by using a whole-animal measure to measure the overall welfare of an animal at one point. 
We would then make an intervention we were interested in testing the effect of, say by changing 
food quality or amount of available shelter. Finally, we would measure overall welfare again, 
to observe the difference in the scores. This difference will help us determine the impact of this 
condition on overall welfare. Repeating this for many conditions would start to give us their 
relative weightings. Use of preference tests to see how strongly animals prefer particular 
conditions over others can also tell us something about their weightings relative to welfare.  
Having looked at a variety of measures, and assessed them against the desiderata, I think 
the current best of the whole-animal measures is cognitive bias, with some more work to ensure 
its validity and accuracy. The best of the combination measures I think will be something like 
the SOWEL model, as it is the only one of the combination models to have a transparent 
aggregation system and an objective way of setting weightings. Something like this model, 
with improved inputs, and with systematic use of preference tests or whole-animal measures 
to set weightings, will be the best way of creating a complete welfare measure. It also allows 
for continual updating as we learn more; the primary strength of this type of system. 
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Using a measure/s such as those described above will allow us to quantify the amount of 
suffering or quality of life of an animal on a typical day within a particular set of conditions, 
such as in a dairy farm, an indoor chicken barn, or a wild setting. However, this is not all that 
is needed to make decisions about our treatment of animals. There are a number of other 
considerations that need to be taken into account, and further work in these areas will help in 
setting priorities for action with regards to animal lives. These calculations don’t take into 
account the side-effects of the systems on other animals (e.g. parents or offspring of production 
animals, or wild animals impacted), which could be important sources of positive or negative 
value. In most cases, these effects will be highly complex to calculate. The model described 
here is not intended to stand in as the sole source of data for decision-making, and separate 
calculations of the secondary costs of production could also be included. 
One important area is in making cross-species comparisons, and the use of something like 
a sentience multiplier to determine their weight in the comparative calculations. This may be 
based on our credence in the possible sentience of the animal, the moral weight we give it in 
our deliberations, or empirical data about the relative capacities of different individuals for 
pleasure and suffering, perhaps based in number of neurons, or complexity of connections. 
Another is in creating a measure to quantify the badness of premature death for animals. This 
can be taken simply as the amount of suffering an animal experiences during the capture, 
handling, transport and slaughter process, but can also include something more to capture the 
disvalue in loss of life. Again, this is likely to be a highly complex philosophical question, and 
one that would be fruitful area for further research. As mentioned earlier in the paper, further 
research in identifying a meaningful neutral or zero point of welfare, would also strengthen the 
value of the calculations performed in this sort of work. 
There is also an important pragmatic question about how we might actually gain access to 
farms in order to assess conditions and animal welfare. Although most farms, at least within 
the developed world, must undergo audits, the information gained is not necessarily publicly 
available. With stricter ‘ag-gag’ laws limiting the ability of industry outsiders to observe or 
report on farm conditions, it may be difficult for interested third parties to make assessments. 
Where conditions are likely to be worst, within the developing world, we are unlikely to have 
any access at all. Where we believe conditions to be poor, it would be unethical for us to 
recreate these conditions for animals, simply for the chance to quantify how bad their suffering 
is. Working together with farmers to gain access to farms and measure and improve welfare is 
probably the best way forward. 
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Once we have an accurate quality of life measure in our calculations, we will be much better 
placed to make decisions about when we should take action on behalf of animals, and of what 
type. We can compare the value of different interventions before deciding what to do. This 
work doesn’t tell us anything specific about what we should do, but gives us better tools for 
figuring it out. Some of the types of actions that can be assessed include advocating for changes 
in production methods to improve welfare and encouraging consumer shifts between or away 
from animal products to reduce numbers or change types of animals used. In particular, a 
recommendation arising from this work is that funding would be well-used in improvement of 
research; to further develop the techniques described for empirically measuring welfare, 
particularly in areas like cognitive bias testing and neuroimaging.  
Accurate measurement of animal welfare is a crucial part of the process of making decisions 
for animal welfare action. This will require active engagement with the current science of 
animal welfare. There is also much more scientific and philosophical research to be done to 
clarify and strengthen our understanding and measurement of welfare. With this work, we get 
closer to having the information we need to make informed and effective decisions to reduce 
suffering and improve animal lives. 
 
 
References 
 Bateson, M., Desire, S., Gartside, S. E., & Wright, G. A. (2011). Agitated honeybees exhibit 
pessimistic cognitive biases. Current Biology, 21(12), 1070–1073. 
Beausoleil, N. J., & Mellor, D. J. (2011). Complementary roles for Systematic Analytical 
Evaluation and qualitative Whole Animal Profiling in welfare assessment for Three Rs 
applications. Proceedings of the 8th World Congress on Alternatives and Animal Use 
in the Life Sciences, Montreal, Canada, 21–25. 
Beausoleil, N. J., & Mellor, D. J. (2015). Advantages and limitations of the Five Domains 
model for assessing welfare impacts associated with vertebrate pest control. New 
Zealand Veterinary Journal, 63(1), 37–43. 
Berns, G. (2018). What It’s Like to Be a Dog: And Other Adventures in Animal Neuroscience. 
Oneworld Publications. 
 29 
Berridge, K. C., & Kringelbach, M. L. (2013). Neuroscience of affect: Brain mechanisms of 
pleasure and displeasure. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 23(3), 294–303. 
Blatchford, R. A., Fulton, R. M., & Mench, J. A. (2016). The utilization of the Welfare Quality 
® assessment for determining laying hen condition across three housing systems. 
Poultry Science, 95(1), 154–163. https://doi.org/10.3382/ps/pev227 
Boissy, A., & Lee, C. (2014). How assessing relationships between emotions and cognition 
can improve farm animal welfare. Revue Scientifique et Technique de l’OIE, 33(1), 
103–110. https://doi.org/10.20506/rst.33.1.2260 
Borsboom, D., Mellenbergh, G. J., & van Heerden, J. (2004). The concept of validity. 
Psychological Review, 111(4), 1061–1071. 
Botreau, R., Bonde, M., Butterworth, A., Perny, P., Bracke, M. B. M., Capdeville, J., & 
Veissier, I. (2007). Aggregation of measures to produce an overall assessment of animal 
welfare. Part 1: A review of existing methods. Animal, 1(8), 1179–1187. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1751731107000535 
Botreau, R., Veissier, I., & Perny, P. (2009). Overall assessment of animal welfare: Strategy 
adopted in Welfare Quality®. Animal Welfare, 18(4), 363–370. 
Bracke, M. B. M. (2001). Modelling of animal welfare: The development of a decision support 
system to assess the welfare status of pregnant sows. Wageningen University. 
Bracke, M. B. M., Metz, J. H. M., Spruijt, B. M., & Schouten, W. G. P. (2002). Decision 
support system for overall welfare assessment in pregnant sows B: Validation by expert 
opinion. Journal of Animal Science, 80(7), 1835–1845. 
Bracke, M. B. M., Spruijt, B. M., Metz, J. H. M., & Schouten, W. G. P. (2002). Decision 
support system for overall welfare assessment in pregnant sows A: Model structure and 
weighting procedure. Journal of Animal Science, 80(7), 1819–1834. 
 30 
Clegg, I. (2018). Cognitive Bias in Zoo Animals: An Optimistic Outlook for Welfare 
Assessment. Animals, 8(7), 104. https://doi.org/10.3390/ani8070104 
Coghill, R. C., McHaffie, J. G., & Yen, Y.-F. (2003). Neural correlates of interindividual 
differences in the subjective experience of pain. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, 100(14), 8538–8542. 
Cotra, A. (2017, September 15). How Will Hen Welfare Be Impacted by the Transition to 
Cage-Free Housing? Retrieved June 12, 2019, from Open Philanthropy Project website: 
https://www.openphilanthropy.org/focus/us-policy/farm-animal-welfare/how-will-
hen-welfare-be-impacted-transition-cage-free-housing 
Czycholl, I., Büttner, K., grosse Beilage, E., & Krieter, J. (2015). Review of the assessment of 
animal welfare with special emphasis on the &quot;Welfare 
Quality&lt;sup&gt;®&lt;/sup&gt; animal welfare assessment protocol for growing 
pigs&quot; Archives Animal Breeding, 58(2), 237–249. https://doi.org/10.5194/aab-
58-237-2015 
Czycholl, I., Kniese, C., Büttner, K., Beilage, E. G., Schrader, L., & Krieter, J. (2016, 
November). Test-retest reliability of the Welfare Quality® animal welfare assessment 
protocol for growing pigs [Text]. Retrieved May 23, 2017, from 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ufaw/aw/2016/00000025/00000004/art00006 
de Graaf, S., Ampe, B., Buijs, S., Andreasen, S., Roches, A. D. B. D., Eerdenburg, F. van, … 
Tuyttens, F. (2018). Sensitivity of the integrated Welfare Quality® scores to changing 
values of individual dairy cattle welfare measures. Animal Welfare, 27(2), 157–166. 
De Mol, R. M., Schouten, W. G. P., Evers, E., Drost, H., Houwers, H. W. J., & Smits, A. C. 
(2006). A computer model for welfare assessment of poultry production systems for 
laying hens. NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences, 54(2), 157–168. 
 31 
Deakin, A., Browne, W. J., Hodge, J. J. L., Paul, E. S., & Mendl, M. (2016). A Screen-Peck 
Task for Investigating Cognitive Bias in Laying Hens. PLOS ONE, 11(7), e0158222. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0158222 
Fleming, P. A., Clarke, T., Wickham, S. L., Stockman, C. A., Barnes, A. L., Collins, T., & 
Miller, D. W. (2016). The contribution of qualitative behavioural assessment to 
appraisal of livestock welfare. Animal Production Science, 56(10), 1569–1578. 
Ginsburg, S., & Jablonka, E. (2019). The Evolution of the Sensitive Soul: Learning and the 
Origins of Consciousness. MIT Press. 
Gutmann, A. K., Schwed, B., Tremetsberger, L., & Winckler, C. (2015). Intra-day variation of 
Qualitative Behaviour Assessment outcomes in dairy cattle. Animal Welfare, 24(3), 
319–326. 
Laubu, C., Louâpre, P., & Dechaume-Moncharmont, F.-X. (2019). Pair-bonding influences 
affective state in a monogamous fish species. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences, 286(1904), 20190760. 
Lee, C., Cafe, L. M., Robinson, S. L., Doyle, R. E., Lea, J. M., Small, A. H., & Colditz, I. G. 
(2018). Anxiety influences attention bias but not flight speed and crush score in beef 
cattle. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 205, 210–215. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2017.11.003 
Low, P., Panksepp, J., Reiss, D., Edelman, D., van Swinderen, B., & Koch, C. (2012, July). 
The Cambridge declaration on consciousness. Presented at the Francis Crick Memorial 
Conference, Cambridge, England. 
Melfi, V. (2013). Is training zoo animals enriching? Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 147(3–
4), 299–305. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2013.04.011 
Mellor, D. J. (2016). Updating animal welfare thinking: Moving beyond the “Five Freedoms” 
towards “A Life Worth Living.” Animals, 6(3), 21. 
 32 
Mellor, D. J. (2017). Operational details of the Five Domains model and its key applications 
to the assessment and management of animal welfare. Animals, 7(8), 60. 
Mendl, M., Burman, O. H. P., Parker, R. M. A., & Paul, E. S. (2009). Cognitive bias as an 
indicator of animal emotion and welfare: Emerging evidence and underlying 
mechanisms. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 118(3–4), 161–181. 
Mendl, M., Burman, O. H. P., & Paul, E. S. (2010). An integrative and functional framework 
for the study of animal emotion and mood. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences, 277(1696), 2895–2904. 
Muri, K., Stubsjøen, S. M., Vasdal, G., Moe, R. O., & Granquist, E. G. (2019). Associations 
between qualitative behaviour assessments and measures of leg health, fear and 
mortality in Norwegian broiler chicken flocks. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 211, 
47–53. 
Ng, Y.-K. (2016). How welfare biology and commonsense may help to reduce animal 
suffering. Animal Sentience: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Animal Feeling, 1(7), 1–
10. 
Norwood, F. B., & Lusk, J. L. (2011). Compassion, by the Pound: The Economics of Farm 
Animal Welfare. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Otten, N. D., Rousing, T., & Forkman, B. (2017). Influence of professional affiliation on 
expert’s view on welfare measures. Animals, 7(12), 85. 
Poirier, C., Bateson, M., Gualtieri, F., Armstrong, E. A., Laws, G. C., Boswell, T., & Smulders, 
T. V. (2019). Validation of hippocampal biomarkers of cumulative affective 
experience. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 101, 113–121. 
Savoie, J. (2018, September 18). Is it better to be a wild rat or a factory farmed cow? A 
systematic method for comparing animal welfare. Retrieved May 28, 2019, from 
Effective Altruism Forum website: 
 33 
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/cimFBQbpjntoBAKCq/is-it-better-to-be-a-
wild-rat-or-a-factory-farmed-cow-a 
Scherer, L., Tomasik, B., Rueda, O., & Pfister, S. (2018). Framework for integrating animal 
welfare into life cycle sustainability assessment. The International Journal of Life Cycle 
Assessment, 23(7), 1476–1490. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11367-017-1420-x 
Scollo, A., Gottardo, F., Contiero, B., & Edwards, S. A. (2014). Does stocking density modify 
affective state in pigs as assessed by cognitive bias, behavioural and physiological 
parameters? Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 153, 26–35. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2014.01.006 
Spruijt, B. M., van den Bos, R., & Pijlman, F. T. A. (2001). A concept of welfare based on 
reward evaluating mechanisms in the brain: Anticipatory behaviour as an indicator for 
the state of reward systems. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 72(2), 145–171. 
Tomasik, B. (2015). The Importance of Wild-Animal Suffering Wild Animal Suffering and 
Intervention in Nature: Studies and Research Contributions. Relations: Beyond 
Anthropocentrism, (2), 133–152. 
Tomasik, B. (2018, July 14). How Much Direct Suffering Is Caused by Various Animal Foods? 
Retrieved May 21, 2019, from Essays on Reducing Suffering website: https://reducing-
suffering.org/how-much-direct-suffering-is-caused-by-various-animal-foods/ 
Ursinus, W., & Schepers, F. (2009). COWEL: a decision support system to assess welfare of 
husbandry systems for dairy cattle. Animal Welfare, 18(4), 545–552. 
Warren, S. (2018, August 22). Suffering by the Pound: Meat and Animal Product Harm 
Comparisons. 
Wemelsfelder, F. (1997). The scientific validity of subjective concepts in models of animal 
welfare. Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 53(1–2), 75–88. 
 34 
Wemelsfelder, F. (2007). How animals communicate quality of life: The qualitative assessment 
of behaviour. ANIMAL WELFARE-POTTERS BAR THEN WHEATHAMPSTEAD-, 16, 
25. 
Wemelsfelder, F., Hunter, E. A., Mendl, M., & Lawrence, A. B. (2000). The spontaneous 
qualitative assessment of behavioural expressions in pigs: First explorations of a novel 
methodology for integrative animal welfare measurement. Applied Animal Behaviour 
Science, 67(3), 193–215. 
Wemelsfelder, F., Hunter, T. E. A., Mendl, M., & Lawrence, A. B. (2001). Assessing the 
‘whole animal’: A free choice profiling approach. Animal Behaviour, 62(2), 209–220. 
Wickham, S. L., Collins, T., Barnes, A. L., Miller, D. W., Beatty, D. T., Stockman, C. A., … 
Fleming, P. A. (2015). Validating the Use of Qualitative Behavioral Assessment as a 
Measure of the Welfare of Sheep During Transport. Journal of Applied Animal Welfare 
Science, 18(3), 269–286. https://doi.org/10.1080/10888705.2015.1005302 
 
 
 
 
